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Introduction

The wireless sector is a key contributor to economic activity and
growth. Wireless service providers are spending approximately $30 billion
annually to upgrade and expand their networks to deploy fourth generation
("4G") mobile broadband across the nation.' Wireless broadband
investment, along with the services and innovation supported by such
investment, are expected to add between $259 billion and $355 billion to
2
the U.S. Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") each year through 2017.
Part II of this article will provide background of the Federal
Communications Commission's ("FCC") goals in designing several
spectrum auctions, including the Incentive Auction-the largest ever
auction of terrestrial wireless spectrum-currently planned for 2016.3 The
purpose of the Incentive Auction is to free up to 120 MHz of the 294 MHz
in the 600 MHz band of prime spectrum currently licensed for over-the-air
4
broadcasting for mobile broadband and other high-value wireless services.
To accomplish this goal, the FCC proposes the use of a two-part auction
process in which broadcast television license holders submit bids for
relinquishing their licenses ("Reverse Auction"), while commercial
broadband providers bid to acquire licenses for the spectrum made
available ("Forward Auction"). 5
The FCC is currently evaluating various auction design elements to
promote competition in the auction. For example, the FCC is considering
spectrum aggregation limits, constraints on the types of bidding allowed,
and the most appropriate framework for the license territories to be used in
the Forward Auction. This article focuses solely on this last design
element. Adopting relatively small geographic territories is necessary to
promote competition and other important economic and social goals, but
may not alone be sufficient to ensure adequate competition and
participation in the Forward Auction. For instance, the FCC could adopt
small geographic license sizes, but still end up with an auction where the
two largest wireless carriers aggregate the entire amount of spectrum

1. Annual Wireless Industry Survey, CTIA-THE WIRELESS ASS'N, http://www.ctia.org/yourwireless-life/how-wireless-works/annual-wireless-industry-survey (last updated June 2014).
2. ALAN PEARCE ET AL., PCIA-THE WIRELESS INFRASTRUCTURE Ass'N, WIRELESS
BROADBAND INFRASTRUCTURE: A CATALYST FOR GDP AND JOB GROWTH 2013-2017 (Sept.

2013), available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7520949630.
3. Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive
Auctions, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 27 FCC Red. 12,357 (2012) [hereinafter Incentive
Auction NPRMJ.
4. Id. at 12,358, 12,372-73.
5. Id at 12,372-77 (Reverse Auction); id. at 12,377-79 (Forward Auction).

234

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[37:2

offered. This outcome would be inconsistent with the goal of promoting
competition in wireless services.
The territory size used for spectrum licenses is as important for valuing
spectrum as parcel size is to valuing real estate. For example, if all parcels
were fifty acres, parcels in Manhattan would be too expensive and too large
for most buyers. In turn, this circumstance would necessitate buyers
seeking a small parcel to bid for more land than they actually need.
Alternatively, otherwise qualified buyers might be prevented from buying
land altogether. Similarly, wrong-sizing spectrum license territories to be
used in future spectrum auctions-in particular, the Incentive Auctionwould likely result in significant, yet avoidable, inefficiencies in the
allocation of scarce radio frequency spectrum. For carriers that are
compelled to bid for wrong-sized spectrum license packages, the added
cost (which can total tens of millions of dollars per license territory) may
be sufficient to discourage their participation altogether, even if they do
actually participate. If bidding carriers are successful, then they will have
fewer resources available to deploy services using the spectrum. Thus, the
efficiency of the auction and the larger goals of the process will suffer in
each case.
Part III of this article will explain why small geographic areas, such as
Cellular Market Areas ("CMAs"), provide an appropriate license territory
framework to ensure that licenses are right-sized in the Forward Auction.
Small territories are preferable to the larger Economic Areas ("EAs") and
even intermediate-size Partial Economic Areas ("PEAs") given their
compatibility with the bidders' spectrum needs. Using small areas would
ensure that the planned auction will reallocate spectrum resources
efficiently, while also promoting competition, economic growth, and
universal broadband service. The FCC has successfully used smaller
geographic license sizes to auction spectrum in the past, and doing so with
the Forward Auction will enable important advantages.
Small license areas are more likely to maximize the amount of
spectrum that is repurposed for the Forward Auction. Specifically, small
areas allow for more granular segmentation in areas where limited amounts
of spectrum are procured through the Reverse Auction, while also reducing
the spectrum that is lost due to international border coordination with
Canada, Mexico, and other encumbrances. Small geographic license sizes
should also maximize opportunities for participation by both large and
small wireless service providers, while promoting efficient build-out of
spectrum acquired in the Forward Auction.
Evidence gathered from past auctions suggests that auction proceeds
are optimized through the use of small areas. Moreover, using small
territories is consistent with the long-term direction of efficient spectrum
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management reform and the evolution of wireless markets, including

secondary market transactions. Finally, Part IV will rebut some of the
arguments made to date against the use of small geographic license areas.
Interested parties, particularly the Competitive Carriers Association
("CCA") and its members, have pressed the FCC to conduct the Forward
Auction with small territory sizes for licenses. Since initially announcing
its position in 2012, the FCC has moved from recommending that the
Forward Auction be licensed using EAs to recommending a compromise
territory size based on PEAs.6
II. Background
In 2010, the FCC released the National Broadband Plan ("Plan"), its
long-term plan for increasing spectrum for wireless broadband.' A key
element of the Plan calls for the reallocation of up to 120 MHz from the TV
broadcast spectrum to the wireless broadband. Although the FCC has used
auctions as its primary method of allocating spectrum licenses since 1994,
Congress recently granted the FCC authority to conduct the first-ever
Incentive Auction under the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act
of 2012 ("Spectrum Act").8 This auction will reclaim spectrum in the 600
MHz band by offering incentive payments to TV broadcasters to surrender
their licenses and make their spectrum available for other wireless uses,
including mobile broadband.
A.

Incentive Auction Goals

Congress established lofty goals for the Incentive Auction. The
Incentive Auction is intended to encourage investment and innovation by
repurposing the maximum amount of broadcast spectrum for flexible
licensed and unlicensed uses, while preserving diversity in broadcast TV
services. 9 Congress also reaffirmed the FCC's authority to adopt rules of

general applicability to promote competition, including those concerning
spectrum aggregation.o
6. See Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive
Auctions, Report and Order, 29 FCC Rcd. 6567, 6600 (2014) [hereinafter Incentive Auction R&O]
(explaining that the number of license territories is expanded from 176 EAs to 416 PEAs).
7. NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/national-broadband-plan (last
visited Mar. 26, 2015).
8. Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-96, § 6403, 125 Stat.
156 (2012).
9. The FCC identifies key policy goals for the Forward Auction band plan, including
utility, certainty, interchangeability, quantity, and interoperability. See Incentive Auction NPRM,
supra note 3, at 12,361-62.
10. See Spectrum Act, Pub. L. No. 112-96, § 6404. Spectrum aggregation limits are a
policy consideration that should be evaluated apart from the advantages of small geographic
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Unleash Innovation and Investment

In 2013, U.S. wireless service providers had revenues of $185 billion
and capital investments of $33.1 billion." A recent study estimated that
wireless broadband investments, along with the services and innovation

they support, will add between $259 billion and $355 billion to U.S. GDP
each year through 2017.12 Over the next several years, wireless services
providers are expected to invest $25 billion to $53 billion upgrading and
expanding their networks to deploy 4G mobile broadband across the U.S. 13
Mobile broadband is a critical infrastructure for innovation and investment
in a host of new technologies and services, such as machine-to-machine
("M2M"), smart health, smart farming, and mobile commerce, to name a
few. 14

Radio frequency spectrum is an essential resource for realizing the
benefits that emergent wireless technologies and services promise. The
Incentive Auction has the potential to promote significant innovation and
investment in the wireless industry by expanding access to prime spectrum
resources.
To actualize this potential, the Incentive Auction must
maximize competition and broaden participation across all levels of the
industry by ensuring that smaller operators can participate. Small operators
are critical for addressing the needs of traditionally underserved rural
markets and contribute significantly to enhancing consumer choice,
competition, and wireless investment.15 For example, the third through
tenth largest wireless providers in the U.S. made a total of $5.5 billion in
capital expenditures in 2013, representing a significant level of
infrastructure investment. 6
2.

Maximize Spectrum Availability

The innovative use of mobile broadband is stimulating the rapid growth
in mobile traffic. Cisco's Visual Networking Index forecasts that global
license sizes set forth here, i.e., the FCC could adopt smaller license sizes and still end up with an
auction where one or two wireless carriers aggregate all of the offered spectrum, contrary to the
goal of promoting competition.
11. See CTIA, supra note 1.
12. See PEARCE ET AL., supra note 2.
13. DELOITTE, THE IMPACT OF 4G TECHNOLOGY ON COMMERCIAL INTERACTIONS,
ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND U.S. COMPETITIVENESS 1 (2011), available at http://www2.deloitte.

com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/technology-media-telecommunications/us-tmt-impactof
-4g-060612.pdf.
14. Id.
15. See generally RAUL KATZ, JAVIER AVILA & GIACOMO MEILLE, TELECOM ADVISORY
SERVS., ECONOMIC IMPACT OF WIRELESS BROADBAND IN RURAL AMERICA (2011), availableat

http://comp etitivecarriers.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Economic-Study-02.24.11 .pdf.
16. CTIA reported that the two largest operators in the U.S., Verizon and AT&T, accounted
for approximately $22 billion of the $33.1 billion in capital expenditures. CTIA, supra note 1.
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mobile traffic will grow at a compounded annual rate of sixty-six percent
through 2017, and predicted that the number of mobile-connected devices
would exceed the world's population by the end of 2014.17 To meet
projected demands, the FCC plans to reallocate prime spectrum from
underutilized broadcast television bands to wireless broadband.' 8 Two
challenges associated with meeting the increased wireless broadband
demand are accommodation of variable spectrum supply and clearance of
sufficient spectrum channels in high-demand metropolitan markets in the
Reverse Auction. Estimates of how much spectrum will be cleared have
varied. Although the Incentive Auction originally targeted the full 120 MHz of
spectrum, more recent forecasts have anticipated somewhat lower amounts.1 9
3.

Promote Consumer Welfare, Economic Growth, and Competitiveness

Enhanced competition among wireless service providers will reduce
prices, expand customer choice, and encourage innovation. In turn, the
realization of these goals will help promote consumer welfare, economic
growth, and the U.S. wireless service providers' ability to compete
globally. The FCC recognizes that "[p]romoting competition is a
fundamental goal of the Commission's policymaking. Competition has
played and must continue to play an essential role in the mobile wireless
industry, leading to lower prices and higher quality for American
consumers and producing innovation and investment in wireless networks,
devices, and services. 20

17.

Cisco Visual Networking Index: Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast Update, 2014-

2019, Cisco, available at http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/
visual-networking-index-vni/white_paper cll-520862.html (last updated Feb. 3, 2015).
Although mobile traffic is growing rapidly, there is a history of overly ambitious forecasts. See
generally Aalok Mehta & J. Armand Musey, Overestimating Wireless Demand: Policy and
Investment Implications of UpwardBias in Mobile DataForecasts (Aug. 15, 2014), available at

http://SSRN.com/abstract=2418364).
18. Grant Gross, FCC Aims to Free up 500 MHz of Spectrum for Broadband, PC WORLD
(Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.pcworld.com/article/190154/article.html.
19. CTIA-THE WIRELESS ASS'N, CONSUMER ELECS. ASS'N, BROADCAST SPECTRUM AND
INCENTIVE AUCTIONS WHITE PAPER (2011), available at http://files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIACEA_
TV Spectrum Whitepaper.pdf. More recently, the FCC appears to have scaled back its original
expectations to 80MHz. See Ivan Schlanger et al., FCC Issues Rules for First-Ever Incentive
Auction of TV BroadcastSpectrum, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM, LLP (June 13,

2014), http://www.skadden.com/insights/fcc-issues-rules-first-ever-incentive-auction-tv-broad castspectrum.
20. Implementation of Section 6002(B) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,
Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to Mobile Wireless,
Including Commercial Mobile Services, 28 FCC Rcd 3700, 3958 (2013) [hereafter FCC's
Sixteenth Wireless Competition Report].
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Allow for More Flexible Spectrum Usage Longer Term

Both the Plan and the President's Counsel of Advisors on Science and
Technology ("PCAST") Report found that merely auctioning cleared
spectrum could not fully satisfy spectrum needs. 2 1 The PCAST Report
recommended additional mechanisms to optimize spectrum utilization and
encouraged the development of more efficient mechanisms to enable
22
As the FCC noted in the Incentive Auction Notice of
spectrum sharing.
Proposed Rulemaking, well-tailored license sizes will:
facilitate the efficient use of spectrum by providing licensees with the
flexibility to make offerings directly responsive to market demands for
particular types of services, increase competition by allowing market
entry by new entrants, and expedite provision of services to areas that
might not otherwise receive service in the near term.23
In the future, we expect that a more dynamic reassignment of spectrum
rights will become the industry norm on both a time and geographic basis.
Ultimately, adopting smaller territory sizes will allow for the flexibility
necessary for reassigning spectrum.2 4
5.

Raise Auction Revenue

The Incentive Auction is expected to raise significant revenues. The
funds to be raised in the Reverse Auction must compensate television
broadcasters for the licenses they relinquish and for the costs of repacking
the continuing channels into the remaining broadcast spectrum. These
repacking costs alone are estimated to be $1.75 billion.25
The Incentive Auction and other spectrum auctions-such as the H-

Block (FCC Auction 96, completed in February 2014) and AWS-3 (FCC
Auction 97, completed in February 2015)-will serve as a source for
21.

FCC, CONNECTING AMERICA: NATIONAL BROADBAND

PLAN

http://transition.fcc.gov/national-broadband-plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf

78-79, available at

(last visited Mar.

27, 2015); PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON Sci. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: REALIZING THE FULL POTENTIAL OF GOVERNMENT-

HELD SPECTRUM TO SPUR ECONOMIC GROWTH (2012) [hereinafter PCAST REPORT], available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcastspectrum report-final_ july
20_2012.pdf.
22. See PCAST REPORT, supra note 21, at xi-xiiv (Recommendations 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 5.4, 7.1).
23. Incentive Auction NPRM, supra note 3, at 12,485.
24. OFCOM, The Future Role of Spectrum Sharingfor Mobile and Wireless Data Services:
Licensed Sharing, Wi-Fi, and Dynamic Spectrum Access (Aug. 9, 2013), available at http://stake
holders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/spectrum-sharing/summary/Spectrum Sharing.pdf
25. Spectrum Act, Pub. L. No. 112-96, § 6403, 126 Stat. 158 (2012) (to be codified as 47
U.S.C. § 309(j)(8)(G)(iii)); Gautham Nagesh, TV Broadcasters Sue Over FCC Auction of
Airwaves, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2014, availableat http://online.wsj.com/articles/tv-broadcasterssue-over-fcc-auction-of-airwaves-1408402394.
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funding FirstNet, a $7-billion nationwide emergency communications
26
system.26 The Incentive Auction must also recover the costs associated
with its administration, as well as raise funds for public safety research,
deficit reduction, state and local implementation funds, and emergency
27
response grants. According to a report that Greenhill & Co. prepared for
the FCC, independent studies, including one conducted by the Expanding
Opportunities for Broadcasters Coalition, estimate that total Incentive
Auction proceeds could approach $45 billion.28
6.

Spectrum Act Requires the FCC to Consider a Variety of Territory Sizes

The Spectrum Act requires the FCC to "consider assigning licenses that
cover geographic areas of a variety of different sizes." 29 Right-sizing
license territories using small geographic license sizes like CMAs offers
the best way to match spectrum needs and licenses to geographic areas.
7.

The FCC Has an Obligationto PromoteParticipationby Small and Rural
Entities

The Communications Act obligates the FCC to implement auction
regulations to promote a number of objectives, including providing
opportunities for small rural entities to participate:
consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity, the
purposes of this chapter, and the characteristics of the proposed service,
[the FCC shall] prescribe area designations and bandwidth assignments
that promote (i) an equitable distribution of licenses and services among
geographic areas, (ii) economic opportunity for a wide variety of
applicants, including small businesses, rural telephone companies, and
businesses owned by members of minority groups and women, and (iii)
investment in and rapid deployment of new technologies and services. 30
Moreover, the FCC must "ensure that small businesses, rural telephone
companies, and businesses owned by members of minority groups and
women are given the opportunity to participate in the provision of
spectrum-based services." 3 Geographic license size is a critical risk factor
in promoting such participation. The relevant risk is that the FCC might

26.
27.

Spectrum Act § 6402, 126 Stat. 208-09.
Id. § 6413, 126 Stat. 235.

28.

GREENHILL & CO., INCENTIVE OPPORTUNITIES OF BROADCASTERS 11 (2014) [hereinafter

GREENHILL REPORT], availableat http://www.tvtechnology.com/portals/4/Greenhill.pdf.
29. Spectrum Act § 6403(c)(3), 126 Stat. 228.
30. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(C) (2012).
31. Id §309(j)(4)(D).
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adopt license territories that are too large for small rural or regional
operators to bid on or use efficiently.
B.

History of the FCC's Use of Different Auction Territory Sizes

The FCC has a long history of using a variety of territory sizes ranging
from CMAs to a single, national license. It issued the original cellular band
licenses on the basis of 734 CMA's3 2 in a process ending in 1991, but the
FCC now favors a single framework.
The early auctions were based on a "trading area" system. The U.S.
was divided into 493 Basic Trading Areas ("BTAs") comprising up to 51
Major Trading Areas ("MTAs") and 5 Regional Personal Communication
Areas ("RPCs"). 34 In 1994 and 1995, the FCC conducted the first spectrum
auctions (for the PCS spectrum).35 The first auction included nationwide
license territories and was quickly followed by the auction of RPC licenses.
Five licenses were awarded in each of the six RPCs, 36 and an auction of
PCS Blocks A and B in each of the 51 MTA's. 37 In 1996, an auction of
additional spectrum in the Personal Communication Service ("PCS") band
("C Block") in smaller territories consisting of the 493 BTAs followed. 3 8
In late 1996 and early 1997, the FCC auctioned the PCS D, E, and F Blocks
of spectrum in BTA territory licenses.
In the late 1990s, the FCC began to utilize a new licensing framework
that divides the country into 176 EAs. 4 0 EAs nest up to 52 Major
Economic Areas ("MEAs") and six Regional Economic Groupings

32. Cellular Service, FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/cellular-service (last visited
Apr. 10, 2015).
33. The first cellular licenses were awarded in the 850 MHz band. The 734 CMAs were
created in 1990 from the Office of Management and Budget's 1980 Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(MSA) (CMAs 1 to 305), the Gulf of Mexico (CMA 306), and the Rural Service Areas (RSA),
which were defined by the FCC and do not cross state boundaries (CMAs 307 to 734). See Maps,
FCC, http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=maps#Geographic Licensing Schemes, for
additional information about FCC territories.
34. See FCC Areas, FCC, OFFICE OF ENG'G & TECH, http://transition.fcc.gov/oet/info/maps/
areas/ (explaining the FCC's territory plans, including formation of EAs in 1997 and how they nest
to larger FCC areas).
35. Auctions Summary, Auction Nos. 1-5, FCC, http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?
job=auctions all (last updated Aug. 18, 2014).
36. Summary of Auction 3: Regional Narrowband (PCS), FCC, http://wireless.fcc.gov/
auctions/default.htm?job=auction_summary&id=3 (last updated Oct. 22, 2007).
37. Summary of Auction 4: Broadband PCS A and B Block, FCC, http://wireless.fcc.gov/
auctions/default.htm?job=auctionsummary&id-4 (last updated June 10, 2013).
38. Summary ofAuction 5: BroadbandPSC C Block, FCC, http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/
default.htm?job-auction-summary&id=5 (last updated June 10, 2013).
39. Summary of Auction 11: Broadband PCS D, E, & F, FCC, http://wireless.fcc.gov/
auctions/default.htm?job=auctionsummary&id= I (last updated May 11, 2011).
40. FCC Areas, supra note 34.
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("REAGs").41 Several recent auctions, including auction number 73 (700
MHz), number 78 (AWS-1), and number 92 (Lower 700 MHz), have used
a combination of both CMA and EA territories. In 1997, the FCC issued
Wireless Communication Service ("WCS") licenses in a combination of the
52 MEAs and the 12 REAGs.4 2
The FCC shifted from using a multiplicity of license territory sizes
toward using a single framework based on EA-sized license territories. 4 3
Initially, the FCC proposed using EAs in the Incentive Auction"-the H
Block spectrum auction4 5 and the AWS-3 auction. 4 6 Some commentators
have advocated for smaller license territories, or at a minimum, for the use
of multiple license territory sizes. 4 7 Currently, the FFC's plan is to license
the 600 MHz band using 416 PEAs, which are a new FCC license territory
that attempt to segment the EAs into urban and rural areas and can be
combined into EAs.48
C.

Review of Industry Size and Concentration

Certain structural features in the wireless service industry raise
concerns about the sustainability of competition in the industry. As the
FCC acknowledges, acquiring necessary spectrum resources poses an
important entry barrier that spectrum policy must address.49
41 Id.
42. Factsheetfor Auction 14: Wireless Communications Service (WCS), FCC, http://wireless.
fcc.gov/auctions/default.htmjob=auctionfactsheet&id=14 (last updated Aug. 4, 2006).
43.

NERA ECON. CONSULTING, LOCAL AND REGIONAL LICENSING FOR THE US 600 MHZ

BAND (INCENTIVE AUCTION) 7 (2014), available at http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/
publications/archive2/PUBNCTA_01 14.pdf ("Most recently, the FCC has favored using the EA
approach alone for major spectrum auctions.").
44. Incentive Auction NPRM, supra note 3, at 12,411.
45. Service Rules for Advanced Wireless Servs. H Block-Implementing Section 6401 of
the Middle Class Tax Relief& Job Creation Act of 2012 Related to the 1915-1920 MHz & 19952000 MHz Bands, 28 FCC Rcd. 9483, 9500 (2013) [hereinafter H-Block R&O].
46. Amendment of the Commission's Rules with Regard to Commercial Operations in the
1695-1710 MHz, 1755-1780 MHz, & 2155-2180 MHz Bands, Petitions for Forbearance, 28 FCC
Rcd. 11,479, 11,502 (2013). FCC ultimately auctioned one of the six AWS-3 blocks (the BI
block of unpaired spectrum) in CMAs. Factsheetfor Auction 97, Advanced Wireless Services
(A WS-3), FCC [hereinafter Factsheet for Auction 97], http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.
htm?job=auctionfactsheet&id=97 (last updated Nov. 12, 2014)
47. Reply Comment of T-Mobile USA, Inc., Nos. 13-185 et al., at 25 (Oct. 28, 2013)
available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7520952497 (noting the various benefits
to small geographic license sizes advocated by small carriers, and concluding that "[a]ccordingly,
T-Mobile supports a hybrid approach under which some licenses would be auctioned on a CMA
basis and others on a larger EA basis"). The Commission's final rules for the AWS-3 auction
included a single 10 MHz block of paired spectrum (5 MHz x 5 MHz) licensed in CMA
territories. FactsheetforAuction 97, supra note 46.
48. See Incentive Auction R&O, supranote 6, 6599-6600.
49. See FCC's Sixteenth Wireless Competition Report, supra note 20, at 3765 ("If a
potential entrant were to attempt to enter the mobile wireless services market, obtaining access to

242

1.

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[37:2

Market Share andRevenue Concentration

According to the FCC, the wireless services industry is highly and
51
increasingly concentrated.5 0 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI")
for the wireless industry was estimated to be 3027 in the year 2013,52 which
Since 2011, the industry has been
is up from 2151 in the year 2003..
consolidated even more as a consequence of significant mergers and
acquisition activity. 54
Forces driving consolidation include the desire to realize both scale and
scope economies. Moreover, the industry is increasingly capital intensive
as operators have upgraded network capacity and deployed new technology
to expand service offerings, improve quality, and support traffic growth.
Enabling ever-faster mobile broadband to support a growing diversity of
interactive and rich multimedia services requires increased spectrum and
capital resources (i.e., more cell sites). The industry is currently upgrading
networks from 3G to 4G LTE technology, which offers important spectral
efficiency benefits and supports the dynamic assignment of wider
bandwidth channels for more diverse and noncontiguous spectrum
resources.5 5 Small regional operators, rural operators, and new entrants
with comparatively smaller market shares and less mature networks are
often at a significant cost disadvantage relative to the largest operators.
Such disadvantages are exacerbated when smaller operators cannot access

spectrum is crucial. . . . Therefore, spectrum policies affect the ability of potential entrants to
access spectrum and to build out or expand capacity.").
50. FCC's Sixteenth Wireless Competition Report, supra note 20, at 3858.
5 1. HHI is the metric used for assessing the degree of "market concentration." U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 5.3 (2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html.
It is computed "by summing the
squares" of the market shares of each firm in the industry. Id.
52. See Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Mobile Conditions with Respect to
Commercial Mobile Services, Seventeenth Report, 29 FCC Rcd. 15,311, 2014 WL 7339736, at
*11 [hereinafter FCC's Seventeenth Wireless Competition Report].
53. See FCC's Sixteenth Wireless Competition Report, supra note 20, at 3756-57. The U.S.
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission consider an industry with an HHI of
between 1500 to 2500 to be moderately concentrated and above 2500 to be highly concentrated.
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FTC, supra note 51, § 5.3.
54. Concentration has increased as a consequence of the Verizon/SpectrumCo,
AT&T/NextWave, AT&T/Alltel, T-Mobile/MetroPCS, Sprint/Clearwire, AT&T/Leap, and
Verizon/Cincinnati Bell Wireless transactions.
55. A key design feature of LTE is to enable much more flexible assignment and use of
spectrum resources. Jeanette Wannastrom, CarrierAgreegation Explained, 3GPP (June 2013),
http://www.3gpp.org/technologies/keywords-acronyms/1 01 -carrier-aggregation-explained.
This
design is useful both for dynamic assignment of spectrum resources to support heterogeneous
application resource requirements and to allow operators to make use of heterogeneous spectrum
resources (i.e., spectrum frequencies that may not be contiguous and may differ by geographic
region). Id. Advanced forms of this design are sometimes referred to as "carrier aggregation." Id.
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spectrum in the same frequency bands, thereby preventing them from
realizing the same economies of scale as the largest operators.
Not surprisingly, industry concentration varies sharply by geographic
market and, as Exhibits 1 and 2 show below, it is highest in rural areas with
low population densities. While most of the top mobile service markets in
urban areas already have four56 or more facilities-based mobile service
providers, rural consumers have fewer choices as market concentration is
higher (see Exhibits 1 and 2 below).57
Exhibit 1: Percentage of Road Miles Covered by Mobile Broadband
Providers in Rural vs. Non-Rural Areas, Jan 201458
I or mare
i6.9%
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3 or m re
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I IRoad
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5 or mare

1

%

__
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aNon-Rural
(%of .S.

Miles)
n Rural (% of
U.S. Road
Miles)

10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Percentate of US Road Miles

56. Effective as of the close of AT&T Inc.'s acquisition of Leap Wireless International, Inc.
in March 2014. See Lead Application, Exhibit 1, Description of Transaction, Public Interest
Showing and Related Demonstrations, at ii-iv, Applications of Cricket License Co., LLC, et al.,
Leap Wireless Int'l, Inc., and AT&T Inc. for Consent to Transfer Control of Authorizations, 29
FCC Rcd 2735 (2014), available at https://wireless2.fcc.gov/UlsEntry/attachments/attachment
ViewRD.jsp;ATTACHMENTS=yP2cVbjSjNZsQFz0tJl8h7nsHkpyTcT2QQWc8yB7KYfBbsTID
R7T! 1418159933!-63431615?applType=search&fileKey=1564493827&attachmentKey-191817
41&attachmentlnd=applAttach.
57. FCC's Sixteenth Wireless Competition Report, supra note 20, at 3940-41 notes that:
[J]ust over 400,000 people in rural areas had no mobile wireless coverage,
while approximately 58,000 in non-rural areas had no mobile wireless
coverage as of October 2012. The percentage of the rural population covered
by at least two providers remained flat at just over 96 percent from July 2010
to October 2012, and was lower than the 99.9 percent of the non-rural
population covered by at least two providers. Further, 87 percent of the rural
population was covered by at least three providers and 69 percent by at least
four providers, compared to 99.5 percent and 98 percent, respectively, of the
non-rural population.
58. FCC's Seventeenth Wireless Competition Report, supra note 52, at *18.
59. FCC's Sixteenth Wireless Competition Report, supra note 20, at 3758. The highest
population density (1,107 pop/sq. mi) occurs in EA 34 (Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL),
and the lowest population density (1 pop/sq. mi) occurs in EA 171 (Anchorage, AK). Id. n.189.
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2.

Spectrum Concentration

Access to spectrum resources is a significant entry barrier to the
wireless services industry. Control of spectrum resources is also highly
concentrated, especially in the prime spectrum below 1 GHz. Although
AT&T and Verizon are the dominant service providers nationally, with
total combined market shares of approximately 65.2%,60 they hold a
disproportionately large share of prime sub-I GHz spectrum (73%).61
The FCC recognizes that the spectrum below I GHz, which will be
included in the Incentive Auction, has particularly attractive propagation
characteristics for serving rural areas due to its long range and superior inbuilding penetration.6 2 To be competitive in rural markets, mobile service
providers need access to this low-band, interoperable spectrum. The
Incentive Auction will be especially important for the development of rural
coverage because it will likely involve the last significant amount of critical
sub-1 GHz spectrum available to be reallocated to mobile broadband in the
foreseeable future.

60. Id. at 3752.
61. Brett Feldman et al., America: Telecom Services - Who Has the Best Spectrum and
What ISIt Worth?, GOLDMAN SACHS RESEARCH REPORT, 37 (2015). Additionally, AT&T and
Verizon control approximately 84 percent of the licensed 700 MHz spectrum and 90 percent of
the 850 MHz licensed spectrum. Id.
62. Policies Regarding Mobile Spectrum Holdings Expanding the Economic and Innovation
Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions, Report and Order, 29 FCC Red. 6133,
2014 WL 2505353, at *2 (2014)
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III. Right-Sizing Spectrum Licenses Requires
Small Geographic Areas
Creating right-sized geographical license territories will ensure that the
territories are sufficiently small enough to maximize the number of mobile
service providers who can efficiently bid for and utilize them. While the
FCC originally proposed to auction licenses based on the 176 EAs (later
changed to 416 PEAs), competitive carriers have urged the FCC to
consider smaller geographic license sizes, such as the 734 CMA-based
territories.63 The choice of license size will have a significant impact not
only on the auction process, but on future service quality, industry
structure, and market competition as well. Benefits of using these smaller
licenses include more unencumbered spectrum available for auction,
increased auction participation and improved bidder incentives, mitigated
volatility, and increased auction revenue, and better alignment for longterm spectrum efficiency.
A.

More Unencumbered Spectrum Available for Auction

Repurposing the maximum amount of broadcast spectrum is a key goal
of the Incentive Auction, and choosing license territories smaller than EAs
will help to achieve this goal. The Incentive Auction faces two important
challenges related to repurposing the maximum amount of spectrum. First,
the risk that the incentives for broadcast licensees to participate in the
Reverse Auction will vary by market, resulting in more spectrum being
cleared in some markets than others. Second, following the Reverse
Auction, the industry will experience technical challenges of repacking the
cleared spectrum and mapping it to new license territories for sale in the
Forward Auction.
Adopting small license territories for the Forward Auction would assist
the FCC in addressing these challenges. Specifically, it would allow more
flexibility in the repacking of remaining television broadcast spectrum for
television broadcasters that decline to participate, encourage greater
broadcaster participation in the Reverse Auction, and help to clear more
spectrum in every geographic market. Additionally, adopting small license
territories will allow the repurposed spectrum to be more easily mapped to
higher-value, unencumbered licenses for sale in the Forward Auction.

63. In instances where this article refers specifically to the advantages of using CMAs, the
conclusions are similarly applicable to other geographic territories smaller in size than EAs that
might be considered for the Incentive Auction.
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FacilitateEfficient Mapping ofBroadcastSpectrum

Small license territories will allow the FCC to more efficiently map
television broadcast spectrum into new territories to avoid unequal amounts
of available spectrum across the country. While the FCC hopes to reclaim
up to 120 MHz of the 294 MHz of spectrum allocated for television
broadcast, it recognizes that nationwide clearing may not be possible for all
frequencies." As the Incentive Auction NPRM indicates, some frequencies
Moreover, the spectrum of those
may not be available in all markets.
broadcast licenses that will continue to operate after the auction must be
repacked into license territories with adequate interference protection,
which includes protection from the spectrum acquired in the Forward
Auction. As broadband use increases, the FCC will likely persist in
seeking to reallocate crowded spectrum bands across the broader radio
frequency spectrum. In doing so, the FCC will face similar repacking and
interference issues in other spectrum reallocation processes.
The FCC allocated television broadcasting licenses on the basis of 210
Designated Market Areas ("DMAs")." Following the Reverse Auction,
the industry will face a complex process of repacking channels and
mapping the freed spectrum from DMAs to new mobile license territories.
The amount of unencumbered spectrum the FCC will clear following the
repacking of the remaining broadcasters will vary significantly based on
the number of broadcasters agreeing to sell their spectrum licenses in the
Reverse Auction.
Licensing schemes following a small-territory approach-such as
CMA-based licensing-would significantly increase the number of markets
that would have 85 MHz of spectrum (or more), based on repacking
alone. Currently, many EAs with less than 85 MHz of total spectrum are
likely to have areas within them with 85 MHz or more available. Thus,
many of these areas could be carved into separate smaller licensed
64. Ruth Milkman, Chief, Wireless Telecomms. Bureau, FCC, A Band Plan that Serves the
Public Interest, OFFICIAL FCC BLOG (June 21, 2013), http://www.fcc.gov/blog/band-plan-servespublic-interest.
65. Incentive Auction NPRM, supra note 3, at 12,419 & 12,545 app. C at 7.
66. The FCC refers to these territories as TMAs (Television Market Areas). FCCAreas,
supra note 34. The Neilson Company coined the term "DMA," which refers to the same areas.
Stuart Sweet, What Is a Designated Market Area (DMA)?, THE SOLID SIGNAL BLOG (Apr. 20,
2014), http://forums.solidsignal.comlcontent.php/3068-What-is-a-designated-market-area-%28
DMA. DMA is the standard reference term; TMAs are rarely used outside of FCC regulatory
filings. See generally id
67. Comments of United States Cellular Corporation, Expanding Economic and Innovation
Opportunities of Spectrum though Spectrum Auction, GN Docket No. 12-268, attachment 1, at 23, 5-6 (Jan. 25, 2013), http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment-search/paginate?sortColumn=applicant
&pageNumber=4&sortDirection=DESC&disseminated.uniqueDate=01%2F25%2F2013&p
ageView-Tabular&pageSize=10.
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territories with at least 85 MHz available for mobile broadband as opposed
to leaving the entire EA with less than 85 MHz. Using a large EA-based
territory approach would increase the overall area that is encumbered (and
thus not usable) by interference protection zones for remaining television
broadcasters. From this perspective, small licensed territories are a more
efficient mapping strategy. Likewise, the EA-based territory model does
not eliminate the challenges of remapping. Consequently, the case for
using relatively larger geographic license areas cannot be made citing
technical mapping concerns, partly due to the resulting less efficient
mapping strategy.
2.

Reduce Encumbered Spectrum in Border Areas

Smaller license territories would allow the FCC to minimize license
territories where spectrum is unusable due to interference across national
borders. Specifically, the use of small territories facilitates spectrum
interference coordination with users in Canada and Mexico. Smaller
CMA-based license territories would allow the FCC to limit the spectrum
resources and markets (i.e., population, or "POPs") that might have areas
within a license territory where the FCC restricts the use of the spectrum to
address border interference coordination issues. In addressing license
boundary issues, the smaller the license territories, the more focused,
flexible, and granular the options will be, because small territories allow
areas encumbered by interference to be mapped into fewer encumbered
territories, leaving more unencumbered territories.
B.

Increased Auction Participation and Improved Bidder Incentives

Adopting small license territories may promote auction participation in
all markets, but especially in the rural markets where the participation of
additional operators is most important due to lower levels of competition.6 8
Increasing the efficiency of bidding also lowers operators' resource
constraints and increases incentives for bidders to build out their territories.
Fundamentally, the smaller the license territory, the lower the expected
price per license because there are fewer people or "POPs," meaning fewer
potential subscribers in each territory. The decrease in price per license
will increase the number of interested bidders who can afford the licenses
and associated costs. Additionally, the smaller the license territory, the
easier it is for a provider to optimize its service coverage area, which is
particularly important for rural carriers who do not provide service
throughout entire EAs. With EAs, or other large license areas, the chance

68. See Exhibits I and 2 supra Part II.C.1, for information related to relative competition in
rural versus urban areas.
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that a carrier will use licensed spectrum inefficiently increases. Instead of
bidding for spectrum in targeted areas more closely matching their needs,
they may need to bid for larger territories that include significant areas they
do not need, or even want.
Requiring operators to buy more spectrum than needed imposes an
unnecessary cost on market participants.
To the extent that larger
territories reduce participants, competition suffers, which, in turn, increases
consumer costs and reduces innovation. Small, targeted territory sizing
will lower the barriers to entry in the market, and allow more entities to
participate. Economists generally believe greater participation in auctions
enhances auction efficiency. 69 Furthermore, participants confronted with
only inefficiently large license territories are likely to lower their bids to
compensate for the inefficiently high capital costs, and build out expenses
and regulatory costs associated with buying and holding the surplus
spectrum assets. The net effect will thereby depress auction proceeds.
Some carriers only have a choice to bid for large spectrum license
packages, and the added cost may dissuade them from participating; 70 or, if
they do participate, they are less likely to offer successful bids. Even if
they successfully participate, they will have fewer resources available to
deploy services using the spectrum. In either case, the efficiency of the
auction process-and its goal of deploying spectrum to those who will put
it to the best use-inevitably suffers.
Unfortunately, a number of wireless operators have already indicated to
the FCC that they will not participate in the Incentive Auction if licenses
are allocated based on EAs (see Exhibit 3 below).

&

69. Jonathan B. Baker, Spectrum Auction Rules That Foster Mobile Wireless Competition,
Policies Regarding Mobile Spectrum Holdings (F.C.C. FWT Docket No. 12-269), FCC (Mar. 12,
2013), available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7022130365; Martin Cave
William Webb, Spectrum Limits and Auction Revenue: the European Experience, FCC (July 29,
2013), available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7520934210; Leslie M. Marx,
Economic Analysis ofProposalsthat Would Restrict Participationin the Incentive Auction, at 23,
FCC (Sept. 18, 2013) [hereinafter Economic Analysis of Auction Participation],available at
http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7520944358
(citing Jeremy Bulow & Paul
Klemperer, Auctions Versus Negotiations, 86 AM. ECON. REv. 180, 180-94 (1996)).
70. According to Dr. Kovacs commenting on the 700 MHz auction:
One of the keys to the success of the small bidders was the availability of
spectrum that covered areas that matched their needs. They did not have to
pay for licenses that were too big for them to fund, either in terms of initial
license cost or ultimate build-out cost.
Anna-Maria Kovacs, Key Lessonsfrom the 700 MHz Auction and What Those Meanfor the Next
One, FIERCEWIRELESS (June 24, 2013), http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/kovacs-key-lessons700-mhz-auction-and-what-those-mean-next-one/2013-06-24.

2015

RIGHT-SIZING BROADBAND SPECTRUM AUCTION LICENSES

249

Exhibit 3: Carriers Indicating They Will Not Participate in an EA
Auction 71
Atlantic Seawinds Communications, LLC

Cellcoml

Ch'at Mobilit
Blueass T elcounClulartion

Sandhill Communications
tyel W irel~
Source: Competitive Carriers Association

71. Letter from Ron Smith, President, Bluegrass Cellular to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec'y,
FCC, No. 12-26 (July 10, 2013), availableat http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view;jsessionid=
G2BhRp2dnNsFQDJGVpCCh4pQ34ydZnTs2B2HZSwFDkRnMvDZnpyp!-1272756975!129180
6534?id=7520929561 (stating that "Bluegrass Cellular will not participate in 600 MHz spectrum
auction if FCC does not license the spectrum in small geographic areas, like CMAs"); Letter from
Patrick D. Riordan, President & CEO, New-Cell, Inc., to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec'y, FCC, No. 13178 (Aug. 5, 2013) available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7520936250
(explaining that "if Commission adopts EAs for its upcoming auctions, [New-Cell] will not be
able to participate"); Letter from Gregory W. Whiteaker, Counsel for Plateau Telecomms, Inc., to
Marlene H. Dortch, Sec'y, FCC, No. 12-268 (July 30, 2013), available at http://apps.fcc.gov/
ecfs/document/view;jsessionid=yhXbR4KPrrsljQvL3dpTVX7vzjClQyBNSXNpT5GpqGzmgl01
558r!-1469015862!-528136363?id=7520934544; Letter from Gregory W. Whiteaker, Counsel for
Nw. Mo. Cellular, to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec'y, FCC, No. 12-268 (July 30, 2013), available at
http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view;jsessionid=TJs8R5GcyjhLCCLZkltKDNm6GLJDMh2
from
Letter
4557;
HGSz5WnG5JXWW84yk25OR!-1469015862!-528136363?id=752093
Gregory W. Whiteaker, Counsel for Chat Mobility, to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec'y FCC (Aug. 8,
2013), No. 12-268, available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=75209369622
(adopting that EAs "would delay the deployment of service to rural areas because the few large
entities able to bid on such licenses have little or no incentive to serve the rural areas included
within the large geographic license areas"); Letter from Gregory W. Whiteaker, Counsel for
Sandhill Comm'ns, to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec'y, FCC, No. 12-268 (Aug. 21, 2013), availableat
http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7520939246; Letter from Gregory W. Whiteaker,
Counsel for VTel Wireless, to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec'y, FCC, No. 12-268 (Sept. 6, 2013),
available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7520942630; Letter from Counsel for
Pub. Serv. Wireless Servs. to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec'y, FCC, GN Docket No. 12-268 (Sept. 18,
2013); Letter from Gregory W. Whiteaker, Counsel for Atl. Seawinds, LLC, to Marlene H.
Dortch, Sec'y, FCC, No. 12-268 (Sept. 18, 2013), available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document
view?id=7520944572; Letter from Jonathan Foxman, President & CEO, MTPCS, LLC d/b/a
Cellular One, to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec'y, FCC, No. 12-268 (Oct. 17, 2013).
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In addition to the carriers listed above, other carriers and investors that
participated in previous EA auctions have exited the mobile operator
market or have been acquired. A partial list of these participants is shown
in Exhibit 4 below.
Exhibit 4: Bidders in Previous EA Auctions that Exited or Were
Acquired
18th Street S ectrum, LLC
Ameri1.can1 Cellular1 Co ora'tionl
Broadband Wireless Unlimited, LLC

ClearWirels
Cea Wireless

PCS Partners, L.P.

Red Roc:k Spkectrum Hli
Toba Inlet PCS
VentureTel 700, Inc.
Wireless Communications Venture
Source: Competitive Carriers Association
Finally, the harm of imposing excessive spectrum costs on small
bidders impacts all bidders and, ultimately, consumers. Specifically, the
failure to assign spectrum efficiently will harm the consumers where the
spectrum is less likely to be built out. This effect will reduce their choices
and ultimately create an artificial spectrum scarcity as other operators may
have been willing to bid for a build-out of that area if it had been available
in a small, targeted area.
The added costs and time associated with re-assigning the spectrum via
secondary markets or subleases will, as the following paragraphs explain,
distort investment in complementary assets, such as radio network
infrastructure. It will also increase the cost and delay the delivery of
broadband to underserved communities.
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Promote ParticipationAmong Small Operators

One pitfall of adopting larger territories is that it will likely
disadvantage rural and regional operators with smaller service coverage
areas. The FCC has recognized that small license territories facilitate
participation from new entrants and from small carriers-rural and nonrural-in spectrum auctions. 7 2 For many small operators, an EA-sized
license is much larger than needed.73 EA-based licenses contain both rural
and urban areas. For example, if a carrier wants spectrum to serve Carroll,
New Hampshire, it must bid for spectrum in EA 3-which includes Boston,
Massachusetts; Providence, Rhode Island; and Windham, Vermont. The
expected cost of acquiring an EA may be financially impossible or
impractical for smaller operators.
Recent auction results suggest that small carriers have a strong interest
in bidding for spectrum in rural areas. Exhibits 5 and 6 show data from the
700 MHz and AWS auctions, respectively.
Exhibit 5: Winning Bidders for B-Block CMAs in 700 MHz Auction 74
Licenses
AT&T

Verizon

150
34

MHz*POPs
1881

Licenses

MHz*POPs

489

77
43

229
66

2
0
0

3
0
0

Qualcomm

1

Frontier (Dish)

0
0

2
0
0

0

0

0

0

118
303

261
2,634

303
425

485
783

T-Mobile (chose not to
participate)
SpectrumCo (Sprint;
chose not to
participate)
Other
Total

Source: Calculations based on the FCC data and documentation.
72. Service Rules for Advanced Wireless Services in the 1.7 GHz & 2.1 GHz Bands, 18
FCC Rcd. 25,162, 25,176 (2003) [hereinafter A WS-1 R&O] ("By being smaller, [CMAs] provide
entry opportunities for smaller carriers, new entrants, and rural telephone companies. Their
inclusion in our band plan will foster service to rural areas and tribal lands and thereby bring the
benefits of advanced services to these areas.").
73. For some operators, and particularly for rural operators, one EA may not cover their
entire service area, but two EAs would provide a larger area than necessary. See Letter from
Patrick D. Riordan, President & CEO, New-Cell, Inc. d/b/a/ Cellcom, to Marlene H. Dortch,
Sec'y, FCC, Comments of Cellcom (Aug. 5, 2013), available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/docu
ment/view?id=752093625 1; see also text accompanying supra note 72.
74. Economic Analysis ofAuction Participation,supra note 69, at 9.
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Exhibit 6: Winnin Bidders for AWS Auction 75

AT&T

Licenses
83
38
20

MHz*POPs
1827
715
769

Licenses
10
35
1

Mz*POPs
47
136
10

Verison

2

11

5

10

0
160
303

0
1063
4384

0
358
409

0
1065
1268

T-Mobile
Cricket

SpectrumCo (Sprint)
Other

Total

Source: Calculations based on the FCC data and documentation.
During auctions that included CMAs, small operators acquired 41% of
the total MHz-POP licenses and 82% of the rural MHz-POP licenses.7 6
This result is far in excess of their roughly 10% market share. Had these
auctions not included CMAs, many of these small operators would likely
have been excluded.77 Reduced participation by small carriers would
further exacerbate the concentration of spectrum resources under the
control of the largest operators.
2.

PromoteEfficient ParticipationofLarge Operators

Large operators generally prefer larger spectrum license areas. Indeed,
the largest national operators might be happiest with national licenses,
which would shut out smaller operators and new entrants, reduce
* *78 *
participation in the auctions, and reduce competition in wireless services.
If licenses are available in smaller territory sizes, however, a national
operator still has the opportunity to aggregate bids on smaller license
territories to create number of licenses that are together comparable to a
national license. Due to the low cost of computerized bidding, transaction
costs of aggregating smaller license territories are likely to be minimal

75. Id at 10.
76. The smaller operators include everyone but the big four (AT&T, Verizon, Sprint, and TMobile). The smaller operators captured 3730 out of the total 9060 MHz-POPs (41%) and 1689
out of the rural 2051 MHz-POPs (82%) auctioned in the 700 MHz and AWS auctions. See
Exhibits 5 and 6 supra Part III.B.1.
77. This conclusion is evidenced by the carriers who have publically indicated that they will
not participate in the Broadcast Inventive Auction if it is held on the basis of EA-sized license
territories evidences this. See supra Exhibit 3, Part III.B.
78. Deborah D. McAdams, Wireless Interest Spar at Senate Spectrum Hearing, TVTECH.
(June 4, 2013), http://www.tvtechnology.com/article/wireless-interests-spar-at-senate-spectrumhearing/219691 (quoting Dr. George Ford as arguing that "if you want to maximize auction
revenues, you should sell one license").
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compared to the high cost of acquiring large blocks of spectrum, which
often cost tens of millions of dollars. Thus, the use of smaller license
territories is unlikely to reduce the participation of large operators in the
auction. When confronting the increased competition for spectrum from
small and rural operators, the large operators may be incentivized to bid
more aggressively.
Additionally, large operators target the most densely populated
portions of any large license territory, which normally eschews rural areas.
In this scenario, the operator would purchase licenses covering both rural
and urban areas in order to acquire the spectrum in the densely populated
portions of the EAs. Accordingly, using small geographic license areas
that separate rural areas from densely populated areas will not dissuade
large operators from bidding. Using small areas will increase total revenue
by allowing small carriers motivated to serve rural areas to target its
bidding where the highest return on investment is expected.
As noted in Section II.C.2 above, the two largest national operators,
AT&T and Verizon, already have significant low-band spectrum resources
nationwide. Any spectrum they acquire in the Incentive Auction will
complement their current low-band spectrum resources. With the new and
more flexible wireless broadband technology (e.g., 4G LTE-based
networks), it is less important that large operators acquire the same amount
of spectrum and the same frequencies in all geographic market areas.
Thus, right-sizing spectrum licenses should help all bidders avoid
excess spectrum costs. Large operators would be able to pinpoint spectrum
additions in urban areas for their capacity and propagation requirements, or
rural areas for their coverage requirements.7 9
3.

Promote Efficient Build-Out

As shown in this section above, the use of EAs will reduce the ability
of small carriers to participate in auctions with large carriers who are likely
to dominate an EA-based auction. In instances where smaller carriers are
able to participate, using EAs will, at a minimum, force the small carriers
to bid on larger territories than they are able to serve efficiently.
In comparison, small operators or new entrants who make winning bids
in auctions based on smaller license territories will have incentives to
accelerate their investment in complementary network infrastructure. This
is because small license territories better target operators' desired service
areas. Faster investment would accelerate the opportunity to realize
economies of scale, scope, and profits from the use of more focused

79.

See AWS-1 R&O, supra note 72, at 25,176-77 ("These local service areas will be

optimal for incumbent operators who may need spectrum capacity only in limited areas.").
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spectrum acquisitions. Moreover, if these small operators already serve a
particular area, their incremental costs will be lower for expanding
coverage to adjacent, underserved areas relative to an operator without
local infrastructure investments already in place.
4.

Reduce Financingand Other Resource Constraints

Better alignment between spectrum territories and operator business
models will result in fewer resources devoted to excess spectrum assets.
More resources will be available to bid for the spectrum that a specific
operator actually desires. In turn, operators will have more resources to
make complementary investments-such as building out license
territories-required to realize the value from spectrum assets. Even if an
operator plans to use the secondary markets to reduce the excess supply of
licensed spectrum, this option results in additional costs and risks that
increase the cost of capital.
For an estimate of the magnitude of such additional resource demands
of large license territories, consider that an EA-sized territory is four to five
times larger than a CMA-sized territory and roughly twice the size of a
PEA-sized territory. Assuming a build-out cost of $2,000 per square mile,
it would cost about $10 million to build a network for a CMA territory as
compared to $40 million for an EA territory, or $20 million for a PEA
territory.80 For an operator whose service area is significantly smaller than
an EA, the additional costs come from either the capital costs of leaving a
large chunk of newly acquired spectrum fallow, incurring the costs of
selling the licenses for the excess spectrum, or greatly expanding network
infrastructure investments, and entering markets where it does not have
existing relationships or spectrum holdings in other frequency bands. For
small operators, scaling their business plans accordingly is relatively more
burdensome and they are more likely to confront financing and other

80. These estimates are conservative, but are based on an estimate for constructing a
nationwide public safety network in the 700 MHz spectrum of $7 billion. Since the U.S. has 3.8
million square miles, corresponding to a build-out cost of $1842 per square mile, or
approximately $2000 per square mile. There are 734 CMAs, each being 5177 square miles
(approximately 5000 square miles); 176 EAs, each being 21,591 square miles (approximately
20,000 square miles); and 416 PEAs, each being 9134 square miles (approximately 9000 square
miles). Earlier this article cited estimates of build-out costs that ranged from $1 to $5 per $1
spent on spectrum acquisition. See State of Wireless Communications: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Comm'ns, Tech. and the Internet of the S. Comm. On Commerce, Sci. and Transp.,
1l3th Cong. 16-17 (2013) (written testimony of George S. Ford, Ph.D, Chief Economist, Phoenix
Ctr. for Advanced Legal & Econ. Pub. Policy Studies), available at http://wirelessbroadband
coalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Dr.-George-Ford-Testimonyl.pdf. On the lower end of
the scale, other economists have assumed as a first-order approximation that spectrum prices and
build out costs are comparable. See Coleman Bazelon & Giulia Mchenry, Spectrum Value, 37
TELECOMMS. POL'Y 737 § 4.3 (2013). This projection is comparable with the lower estimate.
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resource constraints (e.g., skilled personnel) than large operators.8 1 The
largest operators can access deeper wells of financial and personnel
resources, which typically results in significantly higher margins. Hence,
it is reasonable to expect that the costs of dealing with wrong-sized
spectrum territories would disproportionately harm small operators. In
turn, this would reduce their ability to compete in rural markets that, as
shown in Part II.C. 1, are already the most underserved.
Secondary markets are not a cost-free solution to these issues. Before
an operator can resell a portion of its license, it must first finance and
acquire the entire license (i.e., they can't resell a license until they own it).
It may take years to sell an area within a larger territory, particularly in
areas where there are few participants. During this period, capital costs
accrue, build-out deadlines advance, and the operator faces the market risk
of the value of spectrum falling. As the publically available financial
statements of the major wireless carriers show, customer payments are, by
and large, their only source of revenue. Accordingly, wireless customers
will ultimately bear these costs. Clearly, buying a license territory that is
more closely aligned with operators' needs in the first place is preferable.
C. Mitigate Volatility and Increase Auction Revenue

Promoting competition for spectrum in the Incentive Auction will, in
turn, promote the efficient reallocation of spectrum, as well as competition
in the wireless industry. This offers the best prospect for promoting
economic growth, technological innovation, and consumer welfare, which
are the ultimate goals of the auction process. Given the pressing need for
additional commercial spectrum for wireless broadband along with the high
value of 600 MHz broadband spectrum, the Incentive Auctions could
achieve gross proceeds on the order of $45 billion.83 The enhanced
competition from using a small license size offers the best prospects for
maximizing auction revenue while also meeting the auction's other policy
goals, including increased competition.
1.

IncreaseAuction Revenues

With respect to auction revenue, the most likely outcome of selecting a
smaller license territory size is greater auction proceeds. Part III.A of this
article explained why adopting smaller territory sizes maximizes the

81.

See JOE PEEK, U.S.

SMALL BUS. ASS'N, OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, THE IMPACT OF CREDIT

AVAILABILITY ON SMALL BUSINESS EXPORTERS (2013), available at http://www.sba.gov/sites/
default/files/files/rs404tot(3).pdf (explaining that smaller firms are more likely to have more
limited financing options and consequently confront higher capital costs).
82. See FCCs Sixteenth Wireless Competition Report, supra note 20, at 3704.
83. See GREENHILL REPORT, supra note 28, at 2.
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amount of unencumbered spectrum from the auctions. Smaller territory
sizes create better opportunities for all bidders to right-size their bids. This
outcome encourages participation and alleviates the need to reduce bids to
compensate for the costs of acquiring wrong-sized licenses. Taken
together, these effects ensure that the highest value bidders participate in
each market and that the winning bid goes to the operator best able to
realize value from the acquired resources. Thus, an auction based on small
areas allows all bidders the opportunity to bid for the spectrum they need
and to devote the maximum amount of resources to acquiring spectrum.
Furthermore, using small areas may reduce the volatility of prospective
auction proceeds, further enhancing auction efficiency. The increased
participation and improved flexibility in expanding the supply of
unencumbered spectrum should gamer more participation in both the
Reverse and Forward Auctions. While it may not be feasible to predict the
winning bids in particular markets, the added assurance of broad
participation should reduce auction revenue volatility. For example, broad
participation-which ensures that high bidders are not foreclosed-will
help reduce the risk of a low bidding scenario that may fail to meet reserve
requirements and result in less spectrum being cleared. To the extent that
smaller areas help reduce the risks and costs of participation, they will also
help reduce revenue volatility.
Further, it is possible that an auction based on large territories could
provide incumbents with the opportunity to prevent new wireless
competitors from entering the market by acquiring a disproportionate share
of scarce spectrum (i.e., economic foreclosure). However, in the lead up to
Google's bid for the Upper 700 MHz C Block, auction experts and game
theorists advised Google that the net effect of foreclosure can be a
reduction in bids in opposition to incumbents.84 This reduction leads to an
"incumbent dilution discount" through which:
the resulting price [of licenses] will not reflect the fair market
value that otherwise would have been reached. The dilution of
competitive bidders means the final price will be lower than
otherwise would be the case. Recent studies have confirmed that
this is a pervasive aspect of the FCC auction environment.85

84. Richard Whitt, Restoring Competitive Balance to the Upcoming Spectrum Auction,
GOOGLE PUB. POL'Y BLOG (July 23, 2007), http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2007/07/
restoring-competitive-balance-to.html.
85. Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz & Robert Wilson, Auction Revenues in the 700 MHz
Spectrum Auction, FCC (June 27, 2007), available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/
view?id=6519537319).
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In contrast, choosing the smaller territory sizes like CMAs would
render such foreclosure strategies less likely and ultimately contribute to
the FCC's core mission of promoting competition and longterm efficiency
in the markets for wireless services.
2.

PastAuctions Demonstratethe Value ofSmaller Territories

Experience from prior FCC auctions supports the conclusion that
auctions based on CMAs lead to greater aggregate revenue. Dr. Scott
Wallsten recently analyzed 69,000 spectrum sales, including those from
every FCC spectrum auction since 1996, and his analysis on auction size is
summarized in Exhibit 7 below:
Exhibit 7: Relationship of License Sales Price to Population Size Covered
All Ucense Types
ft.
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Source: Wallsten, Scott, Is There Really a Spectrum Crisis?86

Dr. Wallsten notes that "[w]hile the precise order of value by region
differs by specification, regardless of specification the analysis reveals a
clear negative correlation between the size of the region specified by the
license and the revealed private value of the license."8 This observation
86. Scott Wallsten, Is There Really a Spectrum Crisis? Quantifying the Factors Affecting
Spectrum License Value, TECH. POLICY INST. 22 (Jan. 23, 2013), available at https://tech
policyinstitute.org/files/wallsten-is-there really_a_spectrum crisis.pdf.
87. Id. at 21.
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follows from his hypothesis that "[s]maller geographic definitions allow
bidders to more selectively bid on areas they value."8 8
The results of the 700 MHz auction provide support for Dr. Wallston's
hypothesis. In the 700 MHz auction (FCC Auction number 73), the FCC
used a variety of license sizes to allocate the spectrum: EAs for the A
Block and E Block, CMAs for the B Block, REAGs for the C Block and a
nationwide license for the D Block. In this case, the CMA sold for $2.68
per MHz-POP, followed by the EA Blocks A ($1.16 per MHz-POP) and E
($0.74 per MHz-POP), and the REAGs C Block ($0.76 per MHz-POP).
The national license in the D Block only fetched $0.17 per MHz-POP,
which was less than the FCC's minimum reserve price, so the D Block
license was not awarded. 90
D.

Better Alignment for Long-Term Spectrum Efficiency

Smaller territory sizes-including CMAs-are better aligned with the
long-term direction of efficient spectrum management that more narrowly
tailors spectrum capacity by time and geography. In addition to acquiring
spectrum, wireless operators are relying on densification of cell sites and
expansion of small cell deployment to handle increasing traffic loads on
their networks. 91 The goal of spectrum management reform is not just to
achieve a one-time repurposing of spectrum from low value legacy use to
the highest value use. Rather, the goal is also to transition into a spectrum
management regime that is robust and flexible enough to respond to future
needs to repurpose spectrum when even higher value uses come along.
While it may not be possible to forecast which future market
opportunities will grow fastest, it is widely accepted that growth in wireless
data services will drive increased demand for wireless spectrum. 92 Meeting
this demand and redirecting spectrum resources to keep pace with shifting
industry structures, wireless innovation, and market needs will require
spectrum management systems to be more efficient, dynamic, and flexible.
1.

PromoteEvolution ofMore Efficient Secondary Markets

An important feature of auctions is their ability to assign spectrum to
its highest value uses. To ensure this, spectrum licenses should be tradable
on secondary markets. Enabling liquid, efficient secondary markets for
88.

Id. at 22.

89. See Auctions Home, FCC, http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=auctions
home (last updated Oct. 15, 2014), for detailed information about results from prior FCC auctions.
90. Id.
91.

See generally Caroline Gabriel, US Operators Take Different Routes to Densification,

Wireless Watch (Mar. 9,2015), http://www.rethinkresearch.biz/articles/us-operators-take-differentroutes-densification/.
92.

FCC's Sixteenth Wireless Competition Report, supra note 20, at 3706-07.
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spectrum licenses will lower entry and exit barriers for new and smaller
operators consistent with the universal service and competition goals of
the FCC.
The FCC is aware of the importance of the secondary markets for
competition. It notes that "[t]he Commission's secondary market policies
allow existing licensees to obtain additional spectrum capacity and expand
their coverage areas to better meet the needs of their customers, while also
providing new entrants with additional opportunities to access the spectrum
so that they can compete."93 Smaller license territories, such as CMAs, are
more consistent with granular spectrum management, dynamic secondary
markets, and other advanced spectrum sharing that are part of the longterm
direction of communications technology and the FCC. Initial smaller
license territories facilitate the division and sale of spectrum into smaller
pieces. Secondary markets often require smaller license territories much
more so than large license territories because operators often use them to
"fill in" additional coverage areas (to existing market areas) or add capacity
in areas of particularly high demand.
CMAs are also consistent with the FCC's current regulatory review
processes. For example, the FCC reviews secondary market transactions
on a CMA basis.94 An initial license allocation on this same basis would
likely simplify later data collection efforts needed to review secondary
market transactions. As secondary markets become more developed, the
issue of having spectrum already divided into smaller territories is likely to
become increasingly important. Data being available on the basis of
smaller territories should facilitate smaller and more targeted spectrum
exchanges, as well as the FCC's review of secondary market transactions.
2.

Smaller TerritoriesAre Consistent with the Future of Wireless

Despite being a key part of the solution, the allocation of new spectrum
alone cannot accommodate the growth in wireless services and the implicit
demand for spectrum resources.95 The industry will need technical
innovations and denser cell architectures to meet the growing demand for
wireless services of all types.
More spectrally efficient wireless
technologies permit transmission of more bits per Hz, and enable a more

93.
94.

See FCC's Sixteenth Wireless Competition Report, supra note 20, at 3782.
See FCC's Seventeenth Wireless Competition Report, supra note 52, at *15 (indicating

that the FCC considers territories smaller than EA's for merger review, and that CMAs are the
next smaller common FCC territory size); see also Applications of Cellco Partnership d/b/a/
Verizon Wireless and Rural Cellular Corp., 23 FCC Rcd. 12,463, 12,539 (2008) (showing
analysis done on a CMA basis, such as the Verizon merger with Rural Cellular Corp).
95. See Coleman Bazelon & Giulia Mchenry, supra note 80, § 4.2.
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granular and dynamic assignment of spectrum resources. Further, denser
cell architectures enable spatial reuse of frequencies.
In addition to expanding access to available spectrum, these technical
and architectural refinements also enable more dynamic, capable, and
efficient service provisioning. 9 6 The need to economize on power
consumption of consumer hardware devices also encourages moving to
denser, smaller cell sizes, which is increasingly important as mobile
broadband data rates increase.97 To the extent cell sites cover smaller
areas, it is logical for territories to be smaller so that carriers can obtain
licenses for smaller areas where they specifically need to increase capacity
or extend service.
Additionally, modem wireless system architecture is well suited for
smaller license territories. LTE is designed to provide more flexible,
dynamic, and increasingly seamless assignment of spectrum resources to
applications on a granular basis (with respect to frequency, space, and
time).9 8 These enhanced capabilities allow tighter geographic targeting and
adjustment, and are more naturally matched to smaller license territories.
3.

Lower Frequency 600 MHz Spectrum Is Especially Well-Suitedfor Rural
Broadbandand In-Building Penetration

The 600 MHz spectrum, with its longer range than higher frequency
spectrum, is particularly well-suited for deploying mobile service
infrastructure in less dense areas where using smaller cell sites to provide
coverage would be significantly more expensive. 99 According to the FCC,
"[s]pectrum below 1 GHz is considered most suitable for establishing base
network coverage, especially for wide area and in-building coverage. . ."1oo
In addition to being especially applicable for service in rural areas, the 600
MHz spectrum is also very valuable for providing service in urban areas.
Its non-line-of-sight propagation characteristics make it valuable for
expanding in-building coverage and augmenting capacity in urban markets.

96. Frank Rayal, Trends in Wireless Network Dennsification, CiscO (Apr. 21, 2014),
https://communities.cisco.com/community/solutions/sp/mobility/blog/2014/04/2 1/trends-in-wirelessnetwork-densification.
97. Bernard Prkid, Understanding Small Cell Backhaul, ELEC. DESIGN (Apr. 3, 2014),
http://electronicdesign.com/communications/understanding-small-cell-wireless-backhaul.
98. See C. GESSNER ET AL., ROHDE & SCHWARZ, UMTS LONG TERM EVOLUTION
(LTE)-TECHNOLOGY INTRODUCTION: APPLIcATION NOTE (2012), available at http://cdn.rohde-

schwarz.com/pws/dldownloads/dlIapplication/application-notes/Imal 11/IMAl ll_4E_LTEtech
nology introduction.pdf (discussing LTE technology).
99. The Chicken & Egg Spectrum Auction, RURAL WIRELESS ASS'N (Jan. 15, 2015),
http://ruralwireless.org/2015/01/the-chicken-egg-spectrum-auction/.
100. See FCC's Sixteenth Wireless Competition Report, supra note 20, at 3704.
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Using more granular license areas would allow the 600 MHz spectrum
to go to its highest value uses in each of these markets. Because small
operators
disproportionately
address rural markets, 0 1 enabling
economically viable participation from such operators will facilitate
meeting universal service goals while augmenting competition.
Additionally, smaller license territories will enable urban operators to
provide better service in congested urban markets where wireless operators
are experiencing the most rapid traffic growth. 102
4.

No PairingIssues with Other Frequencies

In contrast to other bands, pairing issues do not support a preference
for larger EAs over a size like CMAs in the 600 MHz auction. The FCC's
Notice for Proposed Rulemaking on the AWS-3 auction noted that it is
logical to use EAs because the AWS-3 spectrum is expected to be paired
with other spectrum that were licensed on the basis of EAs. 1 o3 Similarly, in
the recent H-Block Report and Order, the FCC considered EA-based

licensing logical because adjacent bands were also allocated this way.m
This is not the case, however, with the Incentive Auction spectrum. With
the Incentive Auction, the FCC will start with a clean slate in the 600 MHz
band once the television broadcasters are cleared. The choice of license
territories will not be encumbered by prior decisions. If anything, the
argument for license territories that facilitates pairing cuts in favor of
CMAs given that the adjacent 700 MHz band is licensed with a variety of
license sizes-including CMAs-and the 850 MHz band is licensed on a
CMA basis.

101. Smaller carrier wireless trade associations' members, including CCA, disproportionately
consist of operators serving rural areas. About CCA, COMPETITIVE CARRIERS ASS'N,
http://competitivecarriers.org/about/about-rca-2/914473 (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). Likewise,
membership of rural wireless trade associations, including Rural Wireless Organization,
disproportionally consists of smaller operators. About RWA, RURAL WIRELESS ASs'N,
htp://ruralwireless.org/about-rwa/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
102.

ERICSSON, TRAFFIC AND MARKET REPORT: ON THE PULSE OF THE NETWORKED

15 (2012), available at http://www.ericsson.com/res/does/2012/trafficandmarket_
report june_2012.pdf
103. See Amendment of the Commission's Rules with Regard to Commercial Operations in
the 1695-1710 MHz, 1755-1780 MHz, & 2155-2180 MHz Bands, 28 FCC Rcd. 11,479, 11,526
(2013) (discussing that AWS-1 and AWS-4 spectrum is expected to be paired with the AWS-3
spectrum, but the FCC used a variety of license sizes when auctioning AWS- 1).
SOCIETY

104.

H-BlockR&O, supra note 45, at 9500.
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IV. Addressing Concerns of Using Smaller License
Territory Sizes
In the preceding parts, this article explained how the choice of small
license territories (such as CMAs) offers the best prospects for realizing the
goals of the Incentive Auctions. This part addresses concerns that might be
raised suggesting that EAs, or another large territory size, would be
preferable and explains why we believe these concerns are misplaced.
A.

Smaller Territories Will Not Prevent Acquisition of Nationwide
Spectrum

Larger carriers have suggested that small auction territories could make
it more difficult for them to develop national networks and therefore leave
holes in their networks.105 Even if one accepts this argument, it may best
be viewed as an argument in favor of auctioning a portion of the spectrum
as national licenses, but does not offer a compelling justification for
choosing large EAs over smaller license territory sizes entirely. The rest of
this part of the article explains why the choice of small license sizes, instead
of EAs, would not negatively affect the efforts of larger operators to right-size
their spectrum acquisitions, including spectrum for national coverage, when
considering the total market costs.
1.

Carriers Can Bid More

The Incentive Auction's bidding process will most likely be
automated.' 06 Thus, nothing prevents a carrier who wants spectrum for a
larger coverage area (potentially even nationwide) from being the highest
bidder in every CMA the carrier wants to cover.107
As explained above, choosing a small license territory size will
facilitate wider participation and likely yield higher auction proceeds.
Some of this result may be due to bid prices being higher for some licenses
than would have been the case if EAs were chosen, thereby discriminating
against some bidders. To the extent that is the case, the winning bidder
may have to pay more to acquire certain collections of spectrum licenses in
105. Comments of Verizon and Verizon Wireless, Expanding the Economic and Innovation
Opportunitiesof Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions, GN DOCKET No. 12-268, at 61 (Jan. 25,

2013) [hereinafter Verizon Comments], available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=
7022111976.
106. See About Auctions, FCC, http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=aboutauc
tions&page=4 (last updated Aug. 9, 2006) (explaining the FCC's general auction processes,
including automated bidding).
107. For example, AT&T's was able to acquire a near-nationwide footprint with CMAs in
the Lower 700 B Block spectrum. FCC, FCC 700 MHZ BAND AUCTION RESULTS (Mar. 19,
2008) [hereinafter 700 MHz BAND AUCTION RESULTS], available at https://apps.fcc.gov/
2
edocspublic/attachmatch/DA-08-595A .pdf.
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a CMA auction than they would in an EA auction. Of course, it is
understandable that an operator would prefer bids to be lower rather than
higher. But an auction design that motivates larger operators to pay more
for spectrum, while not reducing competition, is a beneficial outcome from
the FCC's perspective. On the other hand, an auction design that promotes
large operators' ability to pay less than they are willing would essentially
be a subsidy. Such a subsidy would not be in the public interest.
2.

No Need to Subsidize CarriersThat Do Not Want to Bidfor All Markets

In suggesting that CMAs' bidding might result in spectrum holes in its
national coverage, Verizon suggests that it may fail to be the winning
bidder for all of the CMAs it wants in a CMA-based auction. 08 The
implication here is that Verizon is unwilling to pay the value of the
spectrum when competitive carriers have strong incentives to acquire small
territories. While it is understandable that Verizon and others may want to
confront less competition in the auctions and pay less for the spectrum they
acquire, this objective is not in the public interest. Large license areas
would direct spectrum away from its most efficient use and subsidize the
acquisition of spectrum by one of the national providers that, many might
argue, already has an excess share of the prime sub-I GHz spectrum.
A more subtle argument relates to the potential risk for hold-up,
assuming that Verizon would be the most efficient licensee for the
spectrum at issue. According to the hold-up argument, a speculator might
recognize Verizon's desire to acquire a national footprint of spectrum and
would be willing to outbid Verizon for a CMA. Having acquired the CMA,
the speculator could then hold up Verizon for surplus rents. This argument
is not convincing for several reasons.
First, the risk of such "hold-up" problems is a challenge for all auction
designs, not just auctions for small license territories.
Second, the
increased competitiveness in a small license territory auction, along with
other design characteristics being contemplated (e.g., bidding in the
Forward Auction for amounts of spectrum instead of specific frequencies
or appropriate build-out requirements), more strongly addresses the risk of
hold-up compared to using large license territories. Third, the presumption
that large carriers are especially vulnerable to hold up in this context is not
credible because the largest carriers are in the strongest bargaining position
and have the deepest resources (spectrum, network, and financial) to
counter extortion attempts by would-be speculators. Finally, the greater
compatibility between smaller CMAs and more liquid secondary markets

108.

See Verizon Comments, supra note 105, at 49.

264

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.1

137:2

makes it more likely that future holes in national operator networks might
be filled by acquiring spectrum after the auction.
3.

Existing Spectrum Holdings Compensatefor Spectrum Holes

Carriers do not need nationwide coverage in any given frequency or
even spectrum band. They do, however, need a portfolio of spectrum in
various bands to service a variety of circumstances. Newer multiband
handsets and 4G LTE network technology make it feasible to operate
national services while switching frequencies using heterogeneous
spectrum holdings. 1 09 Moreover, given their significant spectrum holdings
below I GHz, the two largest carriers have the ability to shift customers to
other bands. Finally, it is worth noting that not even the national operators
have facilities offering ubiquitous coverage110 and, hence, rely on roaming
agreements to provide service in coverage gap areas.
4.

Aggregation of Smaller License Sizes Would Not Involve Significant
TransactionCosts

Larger operators with large coverage areas may argue that even if the
frequencies do not change, there will be additional licensing-related
transaction costs associated with having a larger number of smaller licenses
relative to having fewer EAs. For example, Verizon points to the FCC's
discussion of the transaction costs that may be involved in aggregating
large swaths of spectrum as a reason for using larger territory sizes.' 11 The
computing and management tools associated with managing complex
portfolios of spectrum resources in more dynamic spectrum markets have
advanced significantly during the previous decade.1 2 During this time
computer technology has evolved and auctions have become the most
common method for spectrum allocation globally. Furthermore, the future
of spectrum management points toward small cells. With the increased
emphasis on higher data rates and usage, cell sites will become increasingly

109. See generally GESSNER ET AL., supra note 98.
110. See Coverage Locator, VERIZON WIRELESS, http://www.verizonwireless.com/wcms/
consumer/4g-lte.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2015); see also AT&T Map, AT&T, http://www.att.
com/maps/wireless-coverage.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2015).
Ill. See Verizon Comments, supra note 105, at 62 n. 134 (citing Service Rules for the 746764 & 776-794 MHz Bands, and Revisions to Part 27 of the Commission's Rules, 15 FCC Rcd.
476, 501 (2000) ("[W]hen areas are inefficiently small, the costs of aggregation during or after
the auction in terms of delay and transaction costs may harm both service providers and
customers alike.").
112. See Ying Loong Lee et al., Recent Advances in Radio Resource Management for
HeterogeneousLTE/LTE-A Networks, 16 COMMC'N SURVEYS AND TUTORIAL, IEEE 2142 (2014).
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dense over time.1 13 Additionally, secondary market trading, while
dominated by the two largest carriers, is more advanced today.114 The
combination of better spectrum management tools, the increased need to
transact spectrum more dynamically (in time and space), and the trends
toward smaller cell sites suggest that any such transaction costs are likely
significantly lower today and ought to continue decreasing in the future.
Indeed, the smaller license territories may actually contribute to lowering
transaction costs.
B.

Smaller Territories Will Not Significantly Increase Auction
Administrative Costs

Another concern is that more licenses being auctioned will result in
higher administrative auction costs and, subsequently, in managing the
larger number of small license territories."'5 The authors do not believe any
such increase in costs would be sufficient to outweigh the benefits of using
small license territory sizes.
Given its past use of both large and small license territories, the FCC
clearly has the expertise to handle an auction with many licenses. In fact,
the FCC successfully managed auctions within 493 BTA regions in the mid
1990s.11 6 Since then, the expertise of the FCC and the industry in auctions
has advanced significantly.
Industry and regulators have developed
analytical tools and software to support increasingly complex auction
frameworks, including combinatorial clock auctions."' Therefore, auctions
based on smaller territories today will likely be simpler to manage than the
BTA auctions in the mid 1990s. Moreover, the FCC is proposing an
auction of the 3.5 GHz band Priority Access licenses based on Census
tracts.' 8 More than 74,000 Census tracts exist in the United States." 9 The
FCC's apparent confidence in managing a Census tract territory auction is a

113. John Chapin & William Lehr, Mobile Broadband Growth, Spectrum Scarcity, and
Sustainable Competition, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract-id=199
2423.
114. John W. Mayo & Scott Wallsten, Enabling Efficient Wireless Communications: The
Role of Secondary Spectrum Markets, 22 INFO. ECON. & POL'Y 61 (2010); see also Notice for
Comment on Licensing Models and Technical Requirements in the 3.5 GHz Licensing
Framework, FCC (Nov. 1, 2014) [hereinafter 3.5 GHz Licensing Framework], available at
http://www.fec.gov/document/35-ghz-licensing-framework-pn.
115. See Incentive Auction NPRM, supranote 3, at 12409-12.
116. See Maps, supra note 33, for FCC auction numbers 5, 6, 11, 17, 22, and 23.
117. See generally COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS (Cramton, P., Y. Shoham & R. Steinberg ed.,
MIT Press 2006).
118. 3.5 GHz Licensing Framework, supra note 114.
119. Tom Morton, 74,134 Census Tracts and More GeographicArea Tallies Information,
RANDOM SAMPLINGS, THE OFFICIAL BLOG OF THE U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Oct. 25, 2013), http://

blogs.census.gov/2013/10/25/74134-census-tracts-and-more-geographic-area-tallies-information/.
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further testament to its ability to manage auctions of many small territories
on a nationwide basis, and indicates the general trend toward more granular
management of spectrum resources.
The auctions in the mid 1990s took place when participants and their
advisors had substantially less cumulative experience. 12 0 Presumably, the
software tools for preparing bids and managing the auction have, along
with technology in general and due to twenty years of experience with
spectrum auctions, significantly advanced during this period. With today's
software-assisted auctions and spectrum management, the number of
territories auctioned is unlikely to significantly impact costs. To alleviate
any lingering concerns about burdens of complexity, the FCC could
consider adding additional time between rounds to allow bidders to assess
their positions. Prior experience of successful auctions based on smaller
CMA territories demonstrates that the number of territories does not
impose an excessive burden on bidders. 12 1
Auctioning a larger number of licenses might add to license-related
paperwork, but these costs should be trivial. However, even assuming that
administrative costs would increase as a result of choosing smaller license
areas, it would be inappropriate to view this cost as solely attributable to
the Incentive Auction. The trend in wireless technology and spectrum
management policy is toward narrowly tailored spectrum resource
management.122 Thus, any transaction costs associated with such a move
will be incurred in any case. This granular type of management will enable
more dynamic resource allocation in time, space, and frequency, thereby
greatly expanding the capacity of scarce spectrum. Increasingly fine
articulation of spectrum contours and license areas will support more
efficient secondary market transactions, interference management, and
future efforts to repurpose spectrum to higher-value uses.

120. The first FCC spectrum auction was in 1994. Summary for Auction I-Nationwide
Narrowband (PCS), FCC, http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=auction_summary
&id=1 (last updated Mar. 9, 2007). The recent AWS-3 auction (ending January 2015) was the
FCC's 97th auction. Summary for Auction 97-Advanced Wireless Services (A WS-3), FCC,
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=auction_summary&id=97 (last updated Oct. 1,
2014). Presumably, both the FCC and wireless carriers have gained experience during this
period.
121. 700 MHz BAND AUCTION RESULTS, supra note 107 (including 700 MHz B Block
auctioned in FCC Auction number 73 in 2008, where AT&T was able to acquire a near
nationwide footprint).
122. See generally PCAST REPORT, supra note 21.
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Roaming and Interoperability Costs Will Not Increase Significantly

Another concern associated with using small license territories is the
potential for increased roaming costs.1 2 3 Such a problem exists when a
customer is more likely to cross the smaller territory boundaries than the
boundary of an EA, or larger license territory.
Within a territory-whether it is a CMA, EA, or some other area-a
spectrum license would operate in a particular frequency. But across CMA
boundaries (i.e., in another CMA), the same frequency may not be
available or may be licensed to different operators. Licensing on the basis
of CMAs may enable the clearing of more unencumbered spectrum. In that
context, the fact that more roaming may occur and that it will then incur
additional roaming costs should hardly be regarded as a problem. This is
because the customer who roams to the new spectrum made available by
the use of smaller territories, would be taking advantage of additional
spectrum resources that would not have even been available if larger
license territories were used. The proliferation of multiband handsets and
the likelihood that all handsets working on the Incentive Auction spectrum
work on all of it should facilitate this outcome. 14 Accordingly, the fact
that the same frequency may be allocated to different operators in different
areas, and that users may need to change frequencies more often, is an
inconsequential issue.
This issue highlights another implicit concern that the auctions raise.
Specifically, the wireless costs may increase because of a loss of scale or
scope economies in equipment (network and handset), as operators may
need to support operations across multiple frequencies. While that is true,
it is the explicit goal of spectrum auctions, including the Incentive Auction,
to make new frequencies available for higher value wireless services. The
ability to deploy an asset for a higher value use, however, should not be
viewed as an added cost.
There are certainly global scale and scope economies to be realized
when the market for equipment that operates in a particular frequency is
larger.1 2 5 Opportunities to take advantage of such scale and scope
economies, however, require enormous scale and scope. 126 They do not
123.

PETER CRAMTON,

WHY LARGE LICENSES ARE BEST FOR 700 MHz SPECTRUM

AUCTION, UNIV. OF MD. 5 (2007), available at http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2005-2009/
cramton-700-mhz-large-licenses.pdf.
124. The FCC has mandated that handset operating on any part of the Incentive Auction
spectrum frequency band operate across the entire band. Incentive Auction R&O, supra note
6, at 6866.
125. Kevin Downing, Industry Analysis: Telecom Equipment, VALUE LINE, http://www.value
line.con/Stocks/Industries/IndustryAnalysisTelecomEquipment.aspx#.VSBb9TvF9WE (last
visited Apr. 11, 2015).
126. Id.
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arise at the level of the individual operator, or at the level of CMA versus
EA-sized markets. Instead, these issues arise in the context of global or
national markets.1 2 7 With respect to network equipment and handsets, the
markets are global. Likewise, network design, planning, outside plant
construction, and infrastructure services are readily available to operators
of all sizes from an ecosystem of service providers with national scale.1 2 8
For example, the most significant outside plant cost is associated with the
siting, construction, and management of cell towers. Even the largest
operators have significantly outsourced those activities by relying on
national tower leasing companies.129 Thus, any additional costs realized by
the wireless ecosystem as a consequence of operating in a larger range of
frequencies is not attributable to the choice of smaller territories instead of
larger ones.
This leaves the second concern about whether the choice of smaller
license territories might increase roaming coast. This concern arises where
two different operators own the same frequency in adjacent territories. In
this context, the question would arise as to how the customer should roam.
Should the customer be handed off to the operator with the license in the
adjacent CMA? Should the customer be moved to another frequency
controlled by the customer's original operator (or by that operator's regular
roaming partner)? In both cases, there may be incremental roaming
charges. In the latter case, the customer would require a multi-band
handset that supports the various frequencies to be used for roaming.
While there might be additional roaming expenses, it is unclear whether
they should be viewed as a problem for the following three reasons
illustrated below.
1.

Multiband RadiosAre Already the Norm in Mobile Devices

Multiband radios are already the norm in mobile devices, and the
expectation is that support for multiband radios will increase and is needed
to take advantage of the diverse spectrum resources that will become
increasingly available.1 3 0 Indeed, the Incentive Auction will significantly

127. Id.
128. Large public companies, such as American Tower Corporation and Crown Castle
International, provide tower services; and large equipment companies, including Acatel-Lucent,
Cisco Systems and Ericsson, also provide consulting systems integration services to the industry.
See Exhibitor List Index, SUPER MOBILITY WEEK, http://www.exhibits.supermobilityweek.coi/
2014/public/ExhibitorList.aspx?&pagenum-=1 (last visited Apr. 11, 2015) (providing insight into
the extent of the industry ecosystem).
129. FCC'sSixteenth Wireless Competition Report, supra note 20, at 3906-07.
130. See Qualcomm, Inc., Press Release: Qualcomm RF360 Front End Solution Enables
Single Global LTE Design for Next-Generation Mobile, QUALCOMM (Feb. 21, 2013), available at
https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2013/02/21/qualcomm-rf360-front-end-solution-enables-
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expand the range of frequencies that will be used for wireless broadband
and other services.' Moreover, the transition to LTE, wireless innovation,
and the emerging ecosystem of mixed network roaming (e.g., Wi-Fi
offload) are expanding technical, business, and consumer options for
enabling low-cost roaming and multi-frequency support for wireless data.
Finally, 600 MHz interoperability is likely to significantly increase
roaming opportunities.1 3 2
2.

Not All Radios Need to Roam

Not all radios need to roam because not all uses of the Incentive
Auction spectrum will support high-speed or national mobile roaming
services. The mobile broadband licenses allow their holders a great deal of
flexibility over the services they may offer.1 33 For example, some of the
spectrum may be used for backhaul, fixed wireless broadband, or other
services that have yet to be determined.
3.

Multimode Handsets Are Desirable

If one considers the typical national mobile broadband service, it is
desirable that such handsets be multimode to encourage interoperability
and enhance competition. Operators who wish to offer less capable
handsets (possibly to support legacy, niche, or low-cost customers) always
have the option of acquiring a national license to a particular frequency
band. As this article explains further below, choosing a small license size
does not preclude this this choice, but it does provide access to additional
single-global-lte-design-next (touting Qualcomm's RF360 Front End Solution that offers a
"comprehensive, system-level solution that addresses cellular radio frequency band
fragmentation," capable of supporting more than 40 LTE band classes).
131. As stated in the Introduction, the Incentive auction will free up to 120 MHz of spectrum
for wireless broadband. FCC initiatives at 3.5GHz, 5.9GHz, and elsewhere are also expanding
spectrum availability for wireless devices. Making use of all of these bands will require new
radios, and in most cases, multiband radios.
132. Interoperability ensures handsets that work in any of the 600 MHz spectrum blocks will
work on all of them. Comments of United States Cellular Corp., Expanding the Economic and
Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions, Docket Number 12-268, at 23
(Jan. 25, 2013), available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7022112279=.
This
technology should increase the chances that a wireless customer, who loses a signal from his or
her subscribed carrier, will be able to roam onto another carrier's network on a different spectrum
block, versus a situation where interoperability did not exist and the customers handset only
worked on their carrier's spectrum block. Id at 23-30 (advocating the desirability for
interoperability requirement in the 600 MHz band).
133. Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive
Auctions, 79 Fed. Reg. 48,441 (Aug. 15, 2014) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 0, 1, 2 et al.),
availableat http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-08-15/pdf/2014-18423.pdf.
134. Comments of T-Mobile USA, Inc., Expanding the Economic and Innovation
Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions, WT Docket No. 12-268, at 17 (Jan. 25,
2013), available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7022112404.
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spectrum resources to allow the operator to shift uses (non-mobile or
frequency agile) to free up scarce national frequencies.
In summary, small areas will not likely increase roaming costs and
will more likely expand the tool set for addressing a world where multifrequency, multi-network wireless communication will be the norm.
D.

Post-Auction Adjustments Are Easier with Smaller Territories

Advocates of large license territories argue that after-market
transactions can address any of the issues that may arise from failing to
adopt smaller license territories.1 3 4 Many of these arguments apply equally
well to explain why choosing small territory sizes should not pose a
problem for advocates of large license territories.
The proponents of large license territories argue that licensees whose
original bids are wrong-sized can engage in post-auction spectrum leasing
or secondary market trading to right-size their spectrum acquisitions. 135 To
the extent this argument is true, it would help ameliorate the damage from
wrong-sizing the license territories to be auctioned. However, right-sizing
the licenses at the start would be a better choice than taking those risks and
incurring the resulting costs in the first place.
The risks and costs of too small versus too large auction territories are
likely to be asymmetric. With small licenses, everyone has a symmetric
opportunity to acquire the spectrum in each territory, as foreclosure risks
are minimized. With large licenses, there is the chance that post-auction
secondary markets might not be sufficiently liquid to enable smaller
entrants or rural operators to acquire spectrum resources to make postauction right-sizing adjustments to their spectrum holdings.
Small
providers (and even large providers seeking to fill spectrum holes) would
be dependent on EA-licensees to partition those territories to make
appropriately sized territory (i.e., smaller) spectrum available to them.
Small territory licenses may be sold or aggregated more easily in order to
match spectrum buyers and sellers with heterogeneous supply and demand.
Furthermore, secondary spectrum markets are still emerging and offer
an inadequate alternative for smaller operators to acquire spectrum
resources.1 3 6 The more limited option to lease spectrum from operators
with excess resources reduces the effectiveness of the potential competition
134. Comments of T-Mobile USA, Inc., Expanding the Economic and Innovation
Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions, WT Docket No. 12-268, at 17 (Jan. 25,
2013), availableat http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7022112404.
135. See Verizon Comments, supra note 105, at 46 ("The Commission should then rely on
the secondary market to sort out discrepancies between EAs, rather than on competitive bidding
via Commission auction.").
136. See Mayo & Wallsten, supra note 114, at 61.
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Finally, the surplus generated from
smaller operators might offer.
secondary market trading would accrue to private interests instead of being
captured in the auction proceeds.
V. Conclusion
The case for using smaller license territories for the FCC spectrum
auctions, including the Forward Auction portion of the Broadcast Incentive
Auction, is compelling. Smaller license territories support specific goals of
the Incentive Auction outlined in the Spectrum Act and promote efficient
spectrum use. They will give smaller carriers, particularly rural-based
carriers, the opportunity to compete for the spectrum resources they need.
In turn, this outcome will further the development of a more competitive
mobile broadband market, greater innovation, improved rural coverage, and
greater auction proceeds. Smaller license territories also dovetail with the
longterm U.S. spectrum policy towards more efficient and dynamic
spectrum markets.
Computerized auction processes will minimize
additional administrative costs. The opponents' only concern is that,
with more bidders, the largest wireless companies may have to pay
more to get the large blocks of the spectrum they seek. But such an
outcome is more desirable from a public policy perspective.
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